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For many decades, commercial banks in the United States have been prohibited from making
equity investments in the firms they serve. Rather, they are restricted to providing them with loans
in the form, essentially, of debt contracts. This longstanding regulatory restriction
1 results in
distinctly different roles for bank lenders and equity investors, and has had important implications for
the entire financial sector.
The American system of “commercial banking” presents a sharp contrast with the banking
systems of some other countries, most notably Germany, in which banks are permitted to take equity
positions. Under such “universal banking” arrangements, banks can make equity investments as well
as loans, vote their equity shares, and even hold seats on the boards of directors of nonfinancial firms.
In general, they can be actively involved in all aspects of firm decision-making. In Germany, the
control rights of owner-banks are further enhanced by the fact that they can vote the shares of other
agents which they hold in trust (auftragsstimmrecht).
2
These important differences in banking arrangements have not escaped the notice of scholars
and there is a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, that compares the two types of banking
systems. Indeed, many academics—as well as policymakers—have proposed that the United States
adopt a form of universal banking and this issue is under active, ongoing debate in the Congress.
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The obvious point is that this subject is of significant public policy concern, as well as of academic
interest.
A second issue that looms very large in discussions of banking and bank regulation is the
control of moral hazard problems. Moral hazard in banking can clearly take either or both of two
forms. Moral hazard problems can easily arise in the relationship between banks and the agents to
whom they provide funds. In addition, it has long been recognized that the presence of deposit
insurance gives rise to a moral hazard problem between banks and the providers of deposit insurance2
(the FDIC). [See, for instance, Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Merton (1978).] And indeed,
regulators have often expressed the concern that the establishment of universal banking in the U.S.
could extend the “governmental safety net” far too broadly, that moral hazard problems could be
exacerbated as a consequence, and that they could, potentially, be transmitted beyond the financial
sector. [See, for example, Corrigan (1983, 1987) or Saunders (1994).]
In this paper we investigate the severity of both kinds of moral hazard problems under both
commercial and universal banking. In particular, we investigate optimal bank behavior under each
regime, and then pose the following two questions: (i) how severe is the moral hazard problem
between banks and “borrowers;” and (ii) how severe is the moral hazard problem between banks and
the FDIC?
We begin by studying a system of commercial banking where banks are precluded from taking
equity positions in the firms to which they lend. We show that under commercial banking, banks will
always take some actions to control the moral hazard problem between borrowers and themselves.
These actions also tend to limit the implied obligations of the FDIC, since the active control of moral
hazard problems by banks implies that banks fail less often and, on average, have assets of greater
value when they do fail.
We then contrast this with a banking system (universal banking) where banks take equity
positions in the firms they serve.
4 When banks are allowed to take equity positions, and to assume
some control rights, their incentives to control moral hazard problems can be substantially attenuated.
Indeed, under universal banking banks can share more easily in the benefits of “misallocating” funds,
and they can more easily pass losses onto the FDIC. This exacerbates problems of moral hazard
along both dimensions. Moreover, by exercising their control rights, banks can force firms to
“misallocate” funds even when this is beneficial neither to the firm nor to society (although clearly
it is beneficial to the bank). This alteration in the allocation of funds also has adverse consequences3
for the FDIC. Finally, we identify some economic factors that are conducive to problems of moral
hazard being particularly severe under universal banking. These factors include: (i) low real returns
on savings, (ii) a relatively high return to misallocated funds, (iii) a high cost to banks associated with
deterring moral hazard, and (iv) banks obtaining relatively large equity positions under universal
banking.
Having analyzed these issues we then ask a third question: When will a bank, if given a
choice between a debt and an equity claim, choose to take an equity position in a firm? Loosely
speaking, we find that banks prefer equity claims when: (i) the return to misallocating funds is
relatively high, and hence the moral hazard problem is relatively severe, (ii) their probability of failure
as a commercial bank is relatively high (it will then be even higher under universal banking, again
reflecting greater moral hazard), (iii) ex post state verification costs are relatively low, and (iv) the
bank is able to obtain a relatively large equity position under universal banking. (The latter factor
again is associated with moral hazard problems being more severe under universal banking).
Finally, we show that the two types of banking systems have sharply differing general
equilibrium implications for resource allocations. In particular, under universal banking a larger
portion of the surplus generated by externally financed investment accrues to banks, and less accrues
to the originating investor. This clearly can have far-reaching implications for aggregate investment
activity. In addition, problems of moral hazard in investment will often, as we have noted, be of
greater concern under universal than under commercial banking. Together, these observations suggest
that universal banking can easily have adverse consequences for the overall efficiency of investment.
Our vehicle for addressing the issues just described is a model in which all deposits are fully
insured by the FDIC. Such insurance is socially valuable in our framework because, by assumption,
banks are unable to perfectly diversify risk and most depositor-savers are risk-averse. Further, all
savings and investment is intermediated through banks. The FDIC charges a fixed-rate insurance4
premium to banks,
5 and, in addition, the FDIC has recourse to taxation of savers whenever necessary
to meet its insurance liabilities. Symmetrically, any excess insurance receipts are returned to savers.
Besides banks, the FDIC and savers, a fourth class of agents rounds out the model economy. These
are “entrepreneurs” who are endowed with access to productive investment technologies which require
external financing.
There are three possible sources of moral hazard in our model. Two of these arise
endogenously, and one arises exogenously through the provision of deposit insurance. The first
endogenous source of moral hazard takes the form of a standard costly state verification (CSV)
problem: only the “entrepreneurs” can freely observe the return realizations on their investment
projects. All other agents must employ a costly monitoring technology to observe project returns.
The second endogenous source of moral hazard is that project owners can, prior to investment, divert
funds, consuming them in the form of perquisites and the like. Specifically, in the model
environment investment projects come in two different sizes, large and small. Project owners can
claim to be undertaking the large investment—while actually doing the smaller one—and then
consume the difference in the form of “perks.” This action is unobservable to other agents except
by engaging in costly interim monitoring. It is also socially wasteful, in the sense that the utility of
perquisites consumption is assumed to be less than the utility of income.
If the bank is an equity holder in the project, and if it agrees to the diversion of funds, the
bank then participates in the consumption of perquisites in proportion to its ownership claim.
Alternatively, it can block perquisites consumption by engaging in costly interim monitoring.
However, if the bank has entered into a debt contract it has the option of blocking perquisites
consumption, but cannot itself participate in that activity. This modeling structure is motivated by
the difference in control rights afforded to debt and equity holders, and by the observation that in
practice universal banks actively exercise these rights.5
Intuitively, then, any individual bank perceives costs and benefits to operating as a universal
bank. The most obvious cost associated with taking an equity position is that this entails an
excessively large amount of ex post state verification; as is well-known, debt is the contractual form
that minimizes the expected costs of monitoring. In addition, universal banking can easily exacerbate
problems of moral hazard between a bank and its borrowers. On the other hand, under our
assumptions, universal banks obtain some control rights that permit them to share in the benefits of
misallocating investment capital. And—in part as a consequence—the ability of a universal bank to
extract surplus from borrowers increases relative to that of a commercial bank. In short, then,
operating as a universal bank allows the bank to gain at the expense of its borrowers, and at the
expense of the deposit insurer.
How does changing the contract between a bank and a “borrower” produce these effects? As
we demonstrate, when a bank takes an equity position in a firm, it ceases to have any interest in how
the terms of the contract—or the choice of an investment project—affect its expected monitoring
costs. Quite the opposite is true under a debt contract. As a result, banks may be willing to try to
extract much more “borrower surplus” when they hold an equity position, and they can often do this
by allowing a misallocation of funds to occur. And, of course, a universal bank shares in this benefit.
This logic suggests quite correctly that banks will choose to organize as universal banks when
their potential private gains from funds diversion are relatively high, and when their ability to extract
surplus from borrowers is relatively great. What we conclude, based on this observation, is that there
may well be reason for concern about the incentives created by universal banking. These concerns
will typically be exacerbated by the presence of deposit insurance.
Prior to proceeding, it is useful to relate our work to some of the existing literature on
universal banking. Boot and Thakor (forthcoming), for instance, examines how alternative banking
arrangements affect the incentives for innovation in the financial sector. Berlin, John, and Saunders6
(1996) have studied the role that bank equity investments may play (if permitted), in resolving the
problems of financially distressed firms. Santos (1996a) has examined the welfare implications of
restrictions on (or prohibition of) bank equity investments in nonfinancial firms.
6 In addition, there
is a large empirical literature that isolates and quantifies performance differences between various
banking regimes. [Good examples include Allen and Gale (1995), Hauswald (1996), or Gorton and
Schmid (1996). A number of other related studies are discussed by Saunders and Walter (1994).]
There is also a large literature examining the provision of investment banking services by universal
banks. [See Kroszner and Rajan (1994) or the review by Santos (1996b).] Clearly all of these
studies (with the exception of Santos 1996a), have a substantially different focus from ours. Our
analysis focuses on the severity of both endogenously arising and policy-induced moral hazard under
commercial versus universal banking.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I lays out the model environment,
and Section II describes the behavior of agents, and a general equilibrium of the model under
commercial banking. Section III considers universal banking, and Section IV discusses when banks
will prefer to take equity positions rather than to hold debt claims. Section V offers some concluding
remarks.
I. The Model
We consider an economy which is populated by a continuum of agents who live for two
periods. These agents can be divided into three categories: Borrowers (or entrepreneurs), bankers
(or potential bankers), and depositors (savers). In addition, there is a government that operates a
deposit insurance system. We now describe each set of agents.7
A. Entrepreneurs
Borrowers (entrepreneurs) comprise a fraction aÎ(0,1) of the population. Each borrower
is endowed in period one with access to two investment projects, although at most one of the projects
can be operated. A project that is operated in the first period yields a random gross return of z, per
unit invested, in period 2. For both projects, we assume that z Î [0,¯ z].
Projects are differentiated by their scales of operation, and by their probability distributions
of returns. Project 1 requires q1 > 1 units of first period resources (funds) to operate. Projects are
assumed to be indivisible, so that no project can be operated without a minimum investment, and
investments in excess of the minimum are unproductive. If q1 units are invested in project 1, a
random return z is realized in the second period, with prob(z £ ˜ z)=G ( ˜ z ). We let g(z) denote the pdf
of this distribution, and we assume that g(z) > 0 for all z Î [0,¯ z]. Finally, let ˆ z1 denote the expected
gross return, per unit invested, if project 1 is operated.
Project 2 requires q2 units of funds in the first period, with 1 £ q2 < q1. If project 2 is
operated, then prob(z £ ˜ z)=F ( ˜ z ), and we assume that
F(z) ³ G(z), for all z. (a.1)
Thus, the probability distribution of returns on investments in project 1 stochastically dominates that
on investments in project 2. We also let f denote the pdf of this distribution, and assume that f(z)>0
for all z Î [0,¯ z]. The mean return—per unit invested—on project 2 is ˆ z2. Clearly ˆ z2 < ˆ z1 holds.
We assume that borrowers can operate either project 1 or project 2. However, only one
project can be operated, and we assume that it is infeasible to operate convex combinations of the two
projects. Such assumptions are standard in models of moral hazard and costly state verification.
Borrowers are assumed to have no funds—other than those generated by their investment
returns—in either period. Thus, to engage in any investment, borrowers must obtain external funding.8
If they fail to do so, we assume that they engage in some outside activity that yields the (exogenously
given) utility level u ¯ ³ 0. We also assume that borrowers are risk neutral, so that they will wish to
operate any investment project that yields an expected payoff no less than u ¯.
1. Information
We assume that there are two kinds of informational asymmetries associated with the
provision of external finance. One is a standard costly state verification problem [Townsend (1979),
Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1986, 1987)]. In particular, for either
type of project the random return z can be observed costlessly only by the agent operating the project.
For certain other agents the project return can be observed (after the fact) by incurring a fixed cost
of g units of effort. Here we allow for the possibility that only some agents can engage in state
verification, and that verification costs are not necessarily the same for all individuals who can
undertake it. We describe these features of the model in more detail below.
The purpose of introducing costly ex post state verification is to create some presumption that
debt contracts are not an inferior contractual form—if we abstract from stochastic monitoring. For
this reason, throughout we focus exclusively on ex post monitoring that occurs deterministically.
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In addition to the state verification problem, we allow for the presence of a moral hazard
problem associated with project choice. In particular, we assume that the borrower’s choice of
investment project is not observable to the lender ex-ante. Thus, if a borrower receives q1 units of
funds in period one, he may either invest in project 1, or he may divert q1 − q2 and invest in
project 2. The diverted funds yield “perks” to owners of the project: we describe these “perks” in
more detail below. A borrower who has a second period income of y and who has expended q1 −
q2 units of funds on “perks” receives the lifetime utility y + d(q1−q2). We assume that the preference
parameter d satisfies 0 < d£1, and that ˆ z2 > d.
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While only the borrower knows his own ex ante project choice, we assume that by engaging
in what we call interim monitoring, outside lenders can observe that choice at some cost. More
specifically, after the project investment has been made (and it is then no longer reversible), a lender
can engage in interim monitoring at a cost—in effort—of l.
9 If this cost is incurred, the lender
learns the borrower’s project choice. We allow lenders to liquidate the borrower’s project at this
point: projects of type j have a liquidation value of Lj; j = 1, 2. We also allow interim monitoring
to be done stochastically.
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Interim monitoring is one device by which a lender can attempt to control the moral hazard
problem. We also assume that a second device is available. In particular, we assume that each
borrower can deal with only a single lender, and thus that the lender can control the quantity of funds
obtained by the borrower. Then, by restricting the quantity of funds extended to q2, a lender can
always prevent a diversion of funds into “perks.” However, whenever q1 > q2 is lent, a moral hazard
problem is always potentially present.
B. Bankers
A fraction bÎ(0,1) of the population consists of potential bankers. Each banker is endowed
with one unit of funds in the first period, along with some first and second period effort that can be
expended on interim and ex post monitoring, respectively. By investing one unit of funds in the first
period, a potential banker actuates his ability to engage in both types of monitoring.
11 And, having
expended his own funds, each operating banker must clearly raise some deposits externally.
We assume that investment returns across entrepreneurs are independently distributed. As a
consequence, in view of the assumption that there is a large number of agents, there is no aggregate
uncertainty in this economy. But, to make deposit insurance valuable, it is clearly necessary to
confront the depositors of any bank with some risk that that bank will fail. We accomplish this by10
assuming that any given bank (or banker) has a limited ability to service and monitor loans, and—in
particular—can make only a finite number of loans. Given this assumption, complete diversification
is impossible for any specific bank. In addition, to keep matters as simple as possible, we restrict
each bank to making only a single loan.
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We assume that bankers are risk neutral, and that they care only about second period income
(consumption) and effort expended on monitoring. Let y denote a banker’s second period income,
let eI Î {0,1} denote effort expenditure on interim monitoring (eI = 0 (1) implies that interim
monitoring does not (does) occur), and let eF Î {0,1} denote effort expenditure on observing the final
project return (again, eF = 0 (1) indicates that ex post monitoring does not (does) occur). Then the
banker’s utility is y − leI − geF. Thus l (g) is the cost of interim (ex post) monitoring.
It will sometimes be interesting to think about there being heterogeneity among banks, with
some banks having high and some having low costs of monitoring. Let µ (1−µ) denote the fraction
of banks that have low (high) monitoring costs. A low (high) cost bank engages in interim
monitoring at a utility cost of lL (lH). A low (high) cost bank engages in ex post state verification
at a utility cost of gL (gH). Clearly we assume that lL £l Hand gL £g H , with at least one inequality
being strict. When we are not interested in differentiating among high and low cost banks, we will
simply setµ=0o rµ=1 .
Finally, as the phrase “potential banker” suggests, each potential banker has the option of not
running a bank. In this case the potential banker simply saves his single unit of funds, in effect
becoming a depositor. And to avoid a potential “shortage of banks,” we assume that b³aholds so
that every potential borrower can—at least in principle—find a bank.
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C. Depositors
A fraction 1 − a − b of the population is depositors. Depositors are each endowed with one
unit of funds when young, and they care only about second period consumption. Thus, depositors
each supply their single unit of funds inelastically in the first period.
We also assume that depositors are risk averse, so that they wish to be insured when old.
This insurance is provided through the government (the FDIC), since our “one bank-one borrower”
assumption prevents banks from providing this insurance themselves.
1. Remark
At this point a brief remark is in order regarding the role for banks in this model. If q2 >1
holds, then each funded entrepreneur requires more resources than a single saver could provide (even
if savers did not have to make an investment in monitoring capacity). Familiar arguments (Diamond
1984 and Williamson 1986) then establish a role for intermediation to avoid the duplication of
monitoring costs. Such arguments also apply here even though, under our assumptions, intermediaries
are not able to pool risks, as they are in many other models. Risk sharing is described in the next
section.
D. Deposits and Deposit Insurance
Deposit markets in our model operate as follows. All depositors—as well as potential bankers
who opt to become savers—make a deposit with an active bank. Banks offer to pay the gross market
rate of return r per unit deposited. Banks who lend to sufficiently successful borrowers will be able
to make this payment. However, for banks whose borrowers experience low returns, it will not be
feasible to pay r per unit deposited, and the bank will “fail.”
The fact that depositors are risk averse implies that they will wish to be insured against bank
failures. Moreover, the fact that there is a large number of agents implies that it is feasible for12
society to provide this insurance. We assume that deposit insurance is provided by the government
(FDIC). Since one of our primary concerns is with how the provision of deposit insurance by the
government affects the incentives of commercial and universal banks to control moral hazard, it is
natural for us to assume that deposit insurance is government provided.
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The FDIC behaves as follows. For any bank that makes its promised payment of r per unit
deposited in period two, the FDIC takes no action. However, when a bank pays less than r per unit
deposited the bank fails, and the FDIC liquidates its assets and retains the proceeds. Of course, the
FDIC, like other agents, cannot directly observe the return on any bank’s assets. Thus, in order to
liquidate a bank, the FDIC must engage in costly ex post state verification. For failed banks the
FDIC then ascertains the value of the bank’s assets, and uses the proceeds to pay off bank
depositors.
15 To conduct ex post state verification the FDIC hires private agents, and we assume
that the cost of ex post state verification to the FDIC is gF.
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Since the FDIC cannot raise enough resources from failed banks to cover the losses
experienced by depositors, it must raise some additional resources in other ways. We assume that
in period one the FDIC imposes a flat rate deposit insurance premium of t per unit lent on each
bank.
17 The FDIC—like other agents—must then transfer the resources it obtains between periods.
To do so, we assume that the FDIC simply deposits its tax income with private banks, and earns the
same returns—and is subject to the same risks—as other depositors. This assumption is made
because alternate assumptions would result in the revenue raised by the FDIC having an effect on the
total supply of savings in period one. In practice, we do not typically think that an important aspect
of deposit insurance is how deposit insurance taxes affect the aggregate supply of credit.
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Finally, we want to allow for the possibility that the FDIC’s revenue from deposit insurance
does not necessarily cover its insurance losses. Since FDIC expenditures in period two are perfectly
predictable in period one, we assume that the FDIC can levy a lump-sum tax of t on all depositors13
(including potential bankers who do not choose to operate banks) in the first period to cover any
shortfall. Again, the proceeds of this tax are deposited with private banks. The value t then
represents a measure of the losses incurred by the FDIC.
1. Remarks
Clearly our intention is to stylistically represent actual government policy as it prevails in the
United States. We believe that this is a natural thing to do, since most of the discussion about
problems of moral hazard that would be created by moving toward universal banking in the United
States presume that the current structure of deposit insurance would continue in place. Of course
there is no presumption that these deposit insurance arrangements are in any way optimal.
It is also the case that the FDIC has never had to obtain funding from general tax revenue,
but it surely could—and would—if necessary. Indeed, such “tax funding” was actually authorized
as recently as the FDICIA Act of 1991 (but then proved unnecessary).
The FDICIA Act also provided for deposit insurance premia determined according to a bank’s
risk class, as opposed to the simple flat-rate scheme assumed in our analysis. However, the
assumption of a flat-rate insurance premium does little violence to reality at the present, as an
overwhelming majority of banks are in the same (lowest) risk class. And, of course, until recently
all banks were charged the same premium.
A natural question is whether countries that currently allow universal banking have deposit
insurance mechanisms in place similar to the one we model? In some cases the answer is yes:
Germany provides virtually complete insurance to depositors (Saunders 1997), and Turkey also has
a deposit insurance program. In addition, we believe that the reality is that in most countries informal
“too big to fail” policies render virtually all depositors insured, irrespective of their formal insurance
schemes. For a variety of reasons, including the existence of highly concentrated banking systems14
with a relatively small number of large banks, governments are wont to tolerate bank failures. That
reluctance has been quite evident in the recent banking problems in Europe, South America, and Asia.
Finally, the banks in our model have no outside equity holders. Here this is actually optimal,
since agents with equity shares in banks would be obligated to duplicate monitoring effort. But this
would be an interesting feature of the analysis to modify in future research.
II. Commercial Banking
We now analyze the behavior of banks and borrowers—and discuss the determination of a
full general equilibrium—under two alternative banking arrangements: commercial banking and
universal banking. In this section we exogenously impose a commercial banking structure; by this
we mean that banks are restricted to entering into debt contracts with borrowers. In the next section
we consider banks that take equity positions in the firms they “lend” to. Then, in Section IV, we
comment on when banks that are free to enter into any type of contractual arrangement with
borrowers will choose to take equity positions.
The timing of events is as follows. Each potential banker (knowing deposit rates and contract
terms) chooses whether to open a bank. Those who do not act as bankers become depositors (deposit
their unit of funds with a bank). Those who do act as bankers invest in monitoring capacity.
Once the set of banks is determined, each bank takes deposits and enters into a contractual
arrangement (the nature of the contractual arrangement depends on the type of banking system in
place) with one borrower. After the contract has been entered into, the borrower makes a choice of
which investment project to operate (among those that are feasible given his funding). Subsequent
to project choices being made the bank can, if it desires, engage in interim monitoring (which it may
do stochastically). At this point the bank can also—if it wants—liquidate the project and call the
loan.15
If the loan is not called, the random return z is realized at the beginning of period two. Then
payments are made from the borrower to the bank, and verification of the project return is undertaken
by the bank as called for by the contract. If it is feasible to do so, the bank then pays r per unit
deposited, and pockets any residual. If this is not feasible, the bank is liquidated by the FDIC.
Under commercial banking, banks are restricted to entering into a debt contract with
borrowers. Our notion of a debt contract here closely follows the one that is standard in the costly
state verification literature (Diamond 1984, Gale and Hellwig 1985, and Williamson 1986, 1987).
In particular, a debt contract specifies the following. (a) A probability, denoted p, that interim
monitoring will be undertaken. (b) A set of ex post verification states, which we denote by A.
Ex post state verification does not take place if z Î B = [0,¯ z]−A. (c) A repayment schedule (per
unit borrowed) of R(z), for all z Î A. (d) An uncontingent payment (that is, a gross rate of interest)
x if z Î B. Clearly, B =[ x,¯ z], as in Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986, 1987). (e) A loan
quantity q. Here, it clearly suffices to consider q Î {q2,q1}.
With these preliminaries, we now proceed to consider the behavior of banks and borrowers
under commercial banking.
A. Bank Strategies
Since a funded borrower can invest only in project 1 or project 2, any individual bank’s
strategies are very limited. In this section—as well as Section B—we take the set of active banks,
the rate of interest on deposits, and the deposit insurance premium as given. We then investigate the
optimal behavior of banks of different kinds. We begin by considering each potential bank strategy
in turn.16
1. Strategy 1
One strategy that can be undertaken by a bank is as follows. Lend q1 to a borrower. It is
then feasible for the borrower to undertake either project. To deter the borrower from investing in
project 2 and consuming “perks,” engage in interim monitoring, and liquidate the investment if the
borrower is found to have invested in that project.
19 Of course under this strategy, the interim
monitoring probability p must be set high enough to deter moral hazard.
If a bank follows strategy 1, we denote the interest rate it charges by x1. Then the expected
gross return to a bank from following strategy 1, not inclusive of interim monitoring costs (and per
unit lent) is given by





























































A crucial question in our analysis is, when is there a moral hazard problem under strategy 1?
Under commercial banking, and in the absence of interim monitoring, a borrower who receives q1
units of funds could invest in project 2 and simultaneously spend q1 − q2 on “perks.”
20 A borrower
following this course of action would “default” on its loan if q2z < q1x1. As a result, the expected
payoff to the borrower from investing in project 2 is—absent interim monitoring—17
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Consequently, there is a nontrivial moral hazard problem—under strategy 1—iff








In keeping with our focus on moral hazard problems under different banking arrangements, we
henceforth assume that (a.2) holds.
21 For analytical simplicity we also assume that












Assumption (a.3) simply asserts that when a borrower diverts funds under strategy 1, this does not
imply that he defaults on his loan with probability one.
When (a.2) holds, a bank following strategy 1 must engage interim monitoring to deter moral
hazard. If the bank engages in interim monitoring and the borrower has diverted funds into
expenditures on “perks,” we assume that this “perks” consumption occurs before the project can be
liquidated; hence the borrower gets d(q1−q2). However, if interim monitoring does not occur, a
borrower who diverts funds gets the expected payoff described above. Thus, in order to deter moral



































Since interim monitoring is costly, clearly the bank wants to set p as small as possible. Consequently,
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It is easy to verify that p¢(x1) > 0 holds, so that the probability of interim monitoring must increase
(the moral hazard problem becomes more severe) as the interest rate charged under strategy 1
becomes higher. It is also easy to verify that the value of p given by (3) satisfies p £ 1 iff




holds. Therefore, there is an upper bound on the interest rate that can be charged under strategy 1:
interest rates exceeding this bound render it impossible to deter moral hazard. Let ˜ x denote the
solution to (4) at equality. Then x1 £ ˜ x must hold.
Together our observations indicate that the expected payoff to a bank from following
strategy 1, and from charging the interest rate x1 is given by (not inclusive of the cost of funds)
q1p(x1,q1;g)−l p ( x 1 ). We now discuss the determination of the interest rate x1.19
a. Interest Rate Determination
As is well-known (Williamson 1986, 1987), the function p(x,q1;g) is typically not monotone
in x. Excessively high rates of interest lead to high probabilities of default, high expected monitoring
costs, and low returns to lenders. The probability of interim monitoring is also increasing in x. This
adds an additional factor leading lenders not to want to charge overly high rates of interest.
When the expected return to a lender is not monotonically increasing in the rate of interest,
this opens the possibility that credit can be rationed. In particular, if the supply of funds is low
relative to the potential demand for funds, borrowers will compete with each other for scarce loans.
But there is a limit to how much they can do so, for if they offer excessively high rates of interest
they will make themselves unattractive to lenders.
To simplify our discussion, we henceforth assume that credit is rationed.
23 This make the
determination of loan rates very straightforward; borrowers bid these up to the level that maximizes
a lender’s expected payoff. Define ˆ x1 by
ˆ x1 º [q1p(x,q1;g)−l p ( x )]. (5) argmax
x£x ˜
Then, under strategy 1, credit rationing implies that x1 = ˆ x1.
24
b. The Cost of Funds
In order to evaluate the net expected payoff to a bank from following strategy 1, it is
necessary to describe the bank’s cost of funds under that strategy. A bank following strategy 1 must
raise q1 units of funds to make its loans, and in addition it must raise tq1 units of funds to pay its
deposit insurance premiums. Thus, the bank will have deposits equal to (1+t)q1. It will be feasible
for the bank to pay r on each of these deposits iff its borrower has z ³ r(1+t). Hence, the bank will
fail with probability G[r(1+t)].20
If the bank does not fail, it pays rq1(1+t) to depositors. If it does fail, all its assets are
liquidated to pay depositors. Let F1[r(1+t)] denote the expected transfer from banks to depositors
or the FDIC, as a function of r and t, under strategy 1 (and per unit deposited). Then F1 satisfies








Clearly F¢ 1 > 0 holds, so increases in r or the insurance premium t raise the bank’s cost of funds.
c. Net Payoffs Under Strategy 1
From our previous observations it is immediate that a bank’s net expected profit under
strategy 1, and assuming that credit is rationed, is given by q1{p(ˆ x1,q1;g)−F 1[ r (1+t)]} − lp(ˆ x1). We
now compare this with the expected payoffs available under other strategies open to a bank.
2. Strategy 2
Another option open to a bank would be simply to lend a borrower q2. Under this strategy
it is not feasible for a borrower to invest in project 1 or to divert funds, since if funds are diverted
it will be clear that no project was undertaken. Thus, under strategy 2 a borrower just invests in
project 2, which is an alternative method of dealing with the moral hazard problem.
25
When strategy 2 is followed, clearly no interim monitoring is necessary by the lender.
Moreover, if x2 denotes the interest rate charged, the borrower defaults if z2 < x2. Thus the expected
































Then the bank’s expected return under strategy 2 (per unit lent), not inclusive of its cost of funds, but




























The remarks we made above about the nonmonotonicity of p(−) apply equally to x(−). It follows
that, under credit rationing, a bank following strategy 2 will charge the interest rate
26 x2 = argmaxx
x(x,q2;g) º ˆ x2, and its expected gross return (exclusive of its costs of funds) equals q2x(ˆ x2,q2;g).
a. The Cost of Funds
A bank pursuing strategy 2 needs q2(1+t) units of funds to make its loans and pay its deposit
insurance premiums. It will be feasible for the bank to pay its depositors rq2(1+t) iff its borrower
has z ³ r(1+t): therefore the bank fails with probability F[r(1+t)]. If F2[r(1+t)] denotes the expected
payment by banks to depositors and the FDIC (per unit deposited) under strategy 2, it follows that








Assumption (a.1) implies that F2[r(1+t)] < F1[r(1+t)]; that is, the cost of funds per unit is lower
under strategy 2 than under strategy 1. It is also apparent that F¢ 2 > 0 holds.
b. Net Payoffs Under Strategy 2
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that a bank’s net expected profits under strategy 2
are given by q2{x(ˆ x2,q2;g)−F 2 [ r (1+t)]}, if credit is rationed.
3. Strategy 3
A bank engaged in strategy 1 or strategy 2 attempts to address the moral hazard problem in
some form. There is a third option available to the bank: it might ignore moral hazard altogether.
To be more specific, suppose that a bank lends q1 to a borrower, that (a.2) holds, and that the bank22
engages in no interim monitoring. Then the borrower will invest in project 2, and consume q1 − q2
in “perks.”
27 Under strategy 3, the bank simply allows this to happen.
28
In order to hide the fact that it is following strategy 3, the bank must act as if it is following
strategy 1. Then, in particular, it must charge the interest rate ˆ x1.
29 If it does so, since the borrower
borrows q1, a loan default occurs if q2z < q1ˆ x1. Thus the probability of default is F[(q1/q2)ˆ x1], and
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a. Cost of Funds
In order to pursue strategy 3, a bank needs q1(1+t) units of funds to lend q1 and pay its
deposit insurance premium. The bank can pay depositors r per unit deposited iff q2z ³ rq1(1+t), since
the bank’s loans are invested in the small scale project (project 2). Thus the bank fails with
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b. Net Payoffs Under Strategy 3
Consolidating the discussion of the preceding paragraphs, it is apparent that the net expected
profit of a commercial bank pursuing strategy 3 is given by the expression q2{x[(q1/q2)ˆ x1,q2;g]−
F 2 [(q1/q2)r(1+t)]}. We now proceed to rank the different strategies available to a commercial bank.23
B. A Comparison of Alternative Strategies
In this section we pose the question: which lending strategy will be preferred by any given
bank? The main result of the section is as follows.
PROPOSITION 1. For every commercial bank, strategy 2 is strictly preferred to strategy 3.
Proposition 1 is proved in Appendix A. The proposition makes a strong assertion: strategy 3 cannot
be optimal under commercial banking. Thus a commercial bank will always take some actions to
address the moral hazard problem confronting it, either by restricting the size of its loans, or by
engaging in interim monitoring. As we will show, an analogous statement cannot be made under
universal banking.
Intuitively, a bank pursuing strategy 3 holds a claim on the same assets as a bank following
strategy 2. In addition, it is more constrained in its choice of a loan rate, and it must raise a larger
quantity of deposits than a bank following strategy 2. Finally, it cannot share in the “perks” that
accrue to the borrower under strategy 3, since it has no ownership claim on the firm. Thus, a
commercial bank will never choose to allow its borrowers to divert funds.
A comparison of strategies 1 and 2 is far less straightforward. From our previous discussion
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F ( z )dz.
The expression in (10) reflects several considerations that arise in ranking strategies 1 and 2. First,
p(ˆ x1,q1;g)−( l / q 1 ) p ( ˆ x 1 )>( q 2 / q 1 ) x ( ˆ x 2 , q 2 ; g ) holds iff l is sufficiently small. This expression is24
obviously necessary for the satisfaction of (10): strategy 1 is superior to strategy 2 only if the costs
of interim monitoring are sufficiently small.
30
Second, engaging in strategy 1 requires that the bank raise more funds than would be required
to follow strategy 2. This is expensive, and it becomes more expensive as r(1+t) increases. Thus
high values of r, or high values of t—ceteris paribus—favor banks following strategy 2.
Third, the expected cost of ex post state verification under strategy 1 (2) equals gG(ˆ x1)
[gF(ˆ x2)]. If F(ˆ x2)>G ( ˆ x 1) holds,
31 then strategy 2 involves higher expected ex post monitoring costs
than strategy 1. This works in favor of strategy 1. Moreover, this last observation has an interesting
implication: other things being equal, higher ex post monitoring costs increase the attractiveness of
strategy 1 relative to strategy 2 (if F(ˆ x2)>G ( ˆ x 1)). But, in general, as these observations make clear,
either strategy 1 or strategy 2 might be preferred by any bank, depending on the configuration of
parameters.
C. Bank Heterogeneity, and Some Scenarios
When there is heterogeneity among the set of potential bankers—as when there are low and
high cost banks—there are several possible scenarios with respect to which banks operate, and with
respect to which strategies they follow. We now outline some of the possibilities.
Scenario 1. If the interim and ex post monitoring costs of high cost banks are too high, then
it is possible that only low cost banks will operate, in equilibrium. In this case the low cost banks
may follow either strategy 1 or strategy 2.
Scenario 2. If low and high cost banks have relatively similar monitoring costs, then it is
possible that both types of banks will operate and, moreover, that both types of banks will have the
same optimal strategy.25
Of course when either scenario 1 or scenario 2 is played out—in equilibrium—nothing very
interesting happens as a result of allowing for bank heterogeneity. Thus, when we want to discuss
the implications of having different kinds of banks, we will focus on the third of our scenarios.
Scenario 3. High cost banks do not have monitoring costs that are so high as to deter them
from operating. However, either the interim or the ex post monitoring costs of high and low cost
banks differ sufficiently that they have different optimal strategies.
When scenario 3 transpires, it may be either the high, or the low cost banks that find it
optimal to follow strategy 1. It will be the low cost banks that follow strategy 1 when they have
relatively low (and high cost banks have relatively high) interim monitoring costs, and when ex post
monitoring costs are relatively similar across the banks. On the other hand, it will be high cost banks
that favor strategy 1 if interim monitoring costs are similar across banks, if F(ˆ x2)>G ( ˆ x 1), and if high
cost banks have ex post monitoring costs that are enough higher than those of low cost banks.
The last point is of interest for the following reason. Under scenario 3, some banks follow
strategy 1, while others follow strategy 2. The former set of banks will have a larger volume of loans
and deposits, and a lower probability of failure. When interim monitoring cost differences
differentiate high and low cost banks, the large banks will also have relatively low operating costs.
But, when ex post monitoring cost differences differentiate these banks—and when F(ˆ x2)>G (ˆ x 1)—the
relatively large banks will have high operating costs. In short, there is no logical presumption that
it is the most efficient banks that are also the largest banks.
We will refer to scenario 3a (3b) as the situation where both types of banks operate, and low
(high) cost banks follow strategy 1. Under scenario 3a (3b), equation (10) holds for low (high) cost
banks, while the same equation fails for high (low) cost banks.26
D. General Equilibrium
It remains to determine a full general equilibrium of the model with commercial banking.
There are two components to such a determination. First, the assumption that b³a , coupled with
the assumption that not all potential borrowers are funded (rationing of credit), implies that not all
potential bankers can operate banks, in equilibrium. Thus the marginal banker must be indifferent
between operating a bank and acting as a depositor. In effect, the marginal bank must earn a
“normal” expected profit. Second, the FDIC must break even. We now proceed as follows.
We assume that the FDIC exogenously sets a value for the deposit insurance premium
parameter t. Given t, the remaining endogenous variables in the model are the deposit interest rate,
r, and the lump-sum tax levied by the FDIC, t. In particular, given t, the FDIC’s expected losses
depend on r, both directly and indirectly.
32 Thus, in equilibrium, the lump-sum tax that the FDIC
must impose to balance its budget needs to be determined along with r. We now describe the
remaining equilibrium conditions of the model.
1. “Normal” Profits for Banks
We begin by stating the condition under which banks earn normal profits when all potential
bankers are identical, ex ante. We then give the required modification when there is heterogeneity
among potential bankers.
When all potential bankers are alike, agents who operate banks will either pursue strategy 1
or strategy 2. Then, as per our previous discussion, their expected profits will be given by
Q[r(1+t);g,l] º max{q1[p(ˆ x1,q1;g)−( l / q 1 ) p ( ˆ x 1 )−F 1 [ r (1+t)]], q2[x(ˆ x2,q2;g)
(11)
− F2[r(1+t)]]}.27
On the other hand, agents who do not operate banks will simply become depositors. Such agents pay
the lump-sum tax t, and deposit 1 − t with a bank. Their payoff is r(1−t). Thus, potential bankers
are indifferent between operating and not operating a bank iff
Q[r(1+t);g,l]=r (1−t). (12)
Given t, equation (12) describes a relation between r and t that is depicted in Figure 1. The
locus defined by (12) is upward sloping, since Q is a decreasing function of r. Intuitively, as t rises
the FDIC is engaging in increasingly heavy subsidization of banks at the expense of depositors.
Thus, to maintain an equality of payoffs the deposit rate of interest must rise. This benefits
depositors and is costly to banks. Therefore r and t must move together if banks are to earn only
normal profits.
a. Heterogeneity
When there are both low and high cost banks, matters are somewhat more complicated. In
particular, depending on the fraction of low cost banks in the banker population (µ) and the extent
of credit rationing, it may be the case that only low cost banks operate. Or, it is possible that both
low and high cost banks operate. We describe each case in turn.
When only low cost banks operate, then the marginal banker obviously has low costs. Then
(12) must be replaced with
Q[r(1+t);gL,lL]=r (1−t). (13)
We now describe what is required in order for only low cost banks to operate, in equilibrium.
Let q denote the fraction of borrowers who receive funding. When only one type of bank is
active, each funded borrower gets q1(q2) units of funds, if strategy 1 (2) is preferred by banks. Define
the function q[r(1+t)] by28
q1; if strategy 1 is preferred (by a low cost bank)
q[r(1+t)] = . (14)
q2; if strategy 2 is preferred (by a low cost bank)
Then “uses” of funds of given by qaq[r(1+t)].
With respect to “sources” of funds, there is unit one of funds supplied by every agent who
is not an active bank or borrower.
33 Since the measure of active banks must equal the measure of
funded borrowers, sources of funds are 1 − a(1+q). Hence, an equality between sources and uses
of funds requires that















1+q [ r (1+t)]
.
In order for it to be feasible for only low cost banks to operate, it must be the case that qa £
µb holds. Thus, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for low cost banks alone to operate is that
µb(1+q1) ³ 1−a . If this condition fails, some high cost banks must operate, in equilibrium.
Of course, if only low cost banks operate, there is no heterogeneity among active banks in
our model. Therefore, in the future when we allow for bank heterogeneity, we will assume that some
high cost banks operate. As we have noted, this will be the case if
1−a>µ b (1+q1). (a.4)
Moreover, when some high cost banks operate, clearly the marginal banker must be a high
cost banker. Therefore the marginal banker earns zero profits iff
Q[r(1+t);gH,lH]=r (1−t). (16)
Finally, we have argued that heterogeneity among banks is interesting if and only if some banks
follow strategy 1, while others follow strategy 2. To fix ideas, we henceforth assume (when there29
are high and low cost banks) that low cost banks prefer strategy 1, while high cost banks prefer
strategy 2.
34 Then (16) reduces to
q2{x(ˆ x2,q2;gH)−F 2 [ r (1+t)]} = r(1−t). (16¢)
In addition, this configuration of optimal bank strategies requires that equation (10) be satisfied for
low cost banks, while the same condition is violated for high cost banks.
2. The FDIC “Break-Even” Condition
As before, we begin by describing what is required for the FDIC to break even when all
potential bankers are identical, ex ante. We then show how the analysis must be modified when there
is bank heterogeneity.
Several factors need to be analyzed in order to state the condition that must be satisfied for
the FDIC budget to balance. First, we must know “how many” banks are in operation. Second, we
must know the expected loss of each bank. This, of course, depends on the optimal lending strategy
of banks. Third, we must know the probability of failure for each bank, as this determines the
FDIC’s cost of ex post monitoring. This failure probability also depends on the banks’ optimal loan
strategy. We begin with the measure of banks that are active.
Our assumption of “one bank-one borrower” implies that the measure of active banks must
equal the measure of funded borrowers. Thus, as indicated by equation (15), the mass of banks in
operation is aq = (1−a)/{1 + q[r(1+t)]}. For future reference we note that credit must be rationed
(q < 1 must hold) if
1−a<a (1+q2) (a.5)
as we henceforth assume.30
When aq is the measure of active banks, the FDIC collects aqtq[r(1+t)] in deposit insurance
premiums, and it collects [1 − a(1+q)]t in lump-sum taxes paid by bank depositors. The FDIC, by
assumption, reinvests this income in the credit market earning r per unit deposited in period two.
Thus total second period FDIC income—not inclusive of the assets of liquidated banks—is given by
the expression
r{aqtq[r(1+t) ]+[ 1−a (1+q)]t}=r (1−a)(t+t)q[r(1+t)]/{1 + q[r(1+t)]}.
Total FDIC obligations in period 2 are calculated as follows. Each bank has an expected
payment to depositors and the FDIC (if it fails) of q1F1[r(1+t)] (q2F2[r(1+t)]), if strategy 1 (2) is
optimal. Thus, by the law of large numbers, FDIC payments to depositors (including itself)—net of
income from asset liquidation—equal q1{r(1+t)−F 1[ r (1+t)]} (q2{r(1+t)−F 2 [ r (1+t)]}) if strategy 1
(2) is being followed by banks.
35 Multiplying the appropriate quantity by aq (the mass of active
banks) gives the difference between FDIC obligations to the depositors of failed banks and FDIC
income from asset liquidation.
The other revenue raised by the FDIC must cover this difference, and it must also cover the
monitoring costs incurred by the FDIC in the process of asset liquidation. If banks are engaged in
strategy 1 (2), then a fraction G[r(1+t)] (F[r(1+t)]) of banks fail, and the FDIC’s costs of ex post state
verification are gFG[r(1+t)] (gFF[r(1+t)]). Then if c[r(1+t)] denotes the second period costs of the



































































F[r(1+t)] ; if strategy 2 is optimal for banks31
The FDIC breaks even iff
(17) r(1−a)(t t)q[r(1+t)]/ 1+q [ r (1+t)] = c[r(1+t)].
We now depict the locus defined by (17) diagrammatically. It has several possible
configurations, two of which are depicted in Figures 2.a and 2.b. In those figures, the optimal lending
strategy for banks is strategy 1 (2) if r(1+t) lies to the left (right) of the dotted vertical line. The
function c[r(1+t)] will typically not be continuous at the value of r(1+t) that makes banks indifferent
between the two strategies. Moreover, it is easy to show that c[r(1+t)] can either increase or decrease
as banks shift from strategy 1 to strategy 2, depending on parameter values. In Figure 2.a (2.b), the
FDIC’s costs rise (fall) discretely as the optimal strategy changes from strategy 1 to strategy 2.
If G(z)/z and F(z)/z are both nondecreasing in z, then it is straightforward to show that (17)
defines a locus that is either monotonically increasing, as in Figure 2.a, or that fails to be increasing
only when strategy 1 and strategy 2 yield the same expected payoff to a bank, as in Figure 2.b.
36, 37
Of course, it is also possible that a single lending strategy is optimal for all values of r(1+t): in this
case the locus defined by (17) is continuous.
The determination of r and t in a general equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3. As shown
there, there is considerable scope for multiple equilibria to arise. Across different equilibria higher
values of r are accompanied by higher lump-sum taxes and larger FDIC losses. Of course, as shown
in Figure 3.b, there need not be multiple equilibria for arbitrary configurations of parameter values.
a. Bank Heterogeneity
As before, when there are both high and low cost banks in operation we fix ideas by assuming
that low (high) cost banks optimally follow strategy 1 (2) in lending. We now state the condition
under which the FDIC breaks even when this transpires.32
We continue to denote the fraction of funded borrowers by q. Only funded borrowers who
borrow from low cost banks get a loan of q1; the qa −µ bborrowers who borrow from high cost
banks get a loan of q2. Hence “uses” of funds are qaq2 +µ b ( q 1 − q 2). As before, “sources” of funds
a r e1−a (1+q). Thus, an equality between sources and uses of funds implies that
q =
1−a−µ b ( q 1 − q 2 )
a (1+q2)
.
Clearly, credit is rationed (q < 1 holds) iff
1<a (2+q2)+µ b ( q 1 − q 2 ). (18)
In addition, high cost banks must be active if qa <µ b . This condition is satisfied iff
1−a>µ b (1+q1). (19)
When (18) and (19) hold, there are banks of mass µb (qa−µb) following strategy 1 (2). Thus,
the FDIC collects t[qaq2 +µ b ( q 1− q 2)] in period 1 in deposit insurance premiums, and it also collects
t[1 − a(1+q)] in lump-sum taxes. It is then straightforward to show that the FDIC’s second period
































q 1 − q 2
1+q2
.
In addition, the FDIC’s net obligations to the depositors of the µbG[r(1+t)] low cost banks that fail,
plus its costs of monitoring these banks, equal µb{q1[r(1+t)−F 1 [ r (1+t)]] + gFG[r(1+t)]}. The
FDIC’s net obligations to the depositors of the (qa−µb)F[r(1+t)] high cost banks that fail, plus its
costs of monitoring these banks, equal (qa−µb){q2[r(1+t)−F 2[ r (1+t)]] + gFF[r(1+t)]}. It is then easy


































































When (16¢) and (20) have a solution (r,t) such that (10) holds (fails) for low (high) cost
banks, then we indeed have an equilibrium where low (high) cost banks follow strategy 1 (2).
III. Universal Banking
In this section we analyze optimal bank behavior, as well as the determination of a full
general equilibrium, under a system where all banks are universal banks. By this, of course, we mean
simply that all banks take equity positions in the firms they “lend” to.
38 In the next section we then
compare universal with commercial banking.
When banks take an equity position in the firms operated by their borrowers, two things
happen. First, the transfer between the firm and bank must always be nontrivially state contingent.
Absent stochastic monitoring, this obligates the bank to engage in ex post state verification for
(almost) all project return realizations. This observation implies that at a cost of g, the bank in effect
becomes fully informed about the investment return of the firm. There is, therefore, no gain from
the bank and the borrower entering into any kind of contract other than an equity contract. Thus the
bank is happy to take an equity position alone, rather than entering into a more complicated
contractual arrangement that might have both a debt and an equity component.
Second, when a bank holds equity in a firm, it can share in the consumption of “perks”
generated by the diversion of funds away from project investments. As we will show, this ability to
share in “perks” consumption can substantially alter the set of optimal lending strategies for a bank.34
Throughout the analysis, we let w Î [0,1] denote the share held by the bank in the firm’s
project. And, as before, there are only two claimants: the operator of the firm and the bank itself.
(This arrangement can again be regarded as a type of delegated monitoring.) Finally, we assume that
if a bank has a claim on a fraction w of the firm’s profits, it also has a claim on a fraction w of the
“perks” generated by any diversion of investment funds, if the bank has agreed to—and is aware
of—this diversion. We now consider the strategies available to a universal bank.
A. Bank Strategies
As in Section II, we begin by taking the set of active banks and the rate of interest on deposits
as given. We then investigate the optimal behavior of banks.
As before, there are only three strategies open to banks. A bank can transfer q1 to a firm
and—if there is a moral hazard problem—engage in interim monitoring to deter it. Or, a bank can
transfer just q2 to a firm and, de facto, force the firm to invest in project 2. Finally, a bank can
transfer q1 to a borrower with the idea that the borrower will invest in project 2. In this case, the
bank and the firm jointly expend q1 − q2 on “perks.” We now consider each strategy in turn.
1. Strategy 1
Suppose that a bank invests q1 in an entrepreneur’s project, and takes an equity position of
w1. Then the expected payoff to the entrepreneur is (1−w1)q1ˆ z1, if the entrepreneur invests in
project 1. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur invests in project 2, without the bank’s knowledge,
his expected payoff is (1−w1)q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2).



















It is easy to show that (a.2) implies the satisfaction of the above inequality. Thus, whenever there
is a moral hazard problem for a commercial bank following strategy 1, there is also a moral hazard
problem for a universal bank following strategy 1. Therefore, a universal bank following strategy 1
must engage in interim monitoring.
Let ˜ p denote the probability that a universal bank following strategy 1 will engage in interim
monitoring. Clearly, ˜ p must be set high enough to deter an entrepreneur from diverting funds. As
in Section II, we assume that if funds are diverted, “perks” consumption occurs before the bank has
an opportunity to liquidate the borrower’s project. Thus, an entrepreneur who does divert funds
enjoys utility d(q1−q2) from “perks.” In addition, with probability 1 − ˜ p, the diversion of funds will
not be discovered, and the entrepreneur will have an expected second period income of (1−w1)q2ˆ z2.
Thus, ˜ p must be chosen to satisfy the incentive constraint
q1(1−w1)ˆ z1 ³ (1−˜ p)q2(1−w1)ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2). (21)
Since interim monitoring is costly, clearly ˜ p will be chosen to satisfy (21) at equality.
As is clear from an inspection of (21), if the bank takes too large an equity position, it will
not be possible to deter moral hazard under any circumstances. In effect, then, there is an upper
bound on the equity position that can be taken by a bank following strategy 1, and
w1 £ 1−d ( q 1 − q 2 )/q1ˆ z1 (22)
must hold. When (22) is satisfied, equation (21) implies that a bank following strategy 1 will engage
in interim monitoring with probability
˜ p ={ q 2ˆ z 2−q 1ˆ z 1+[ d ( q 1 − q 2 )/(1−w1)]}/q2ˆ z2 º ˜ p(w1). (23)36
Clearly, ˜ p¢(w1) > 0 holds, for all w1 satisfying (22) as a strict inequality. Moreover, since the bank
must engage in ex post state verification in (almost) all states, the expected return to the bank—not
inclusive of the cost of funds—from following strategy 1 is given by w1q1ˆ z1 − l˜ p(w1)−g .
a. Cost of Funds
A bank following strategy 1 requires q1(1+t) units of funds to make its loan(s) and to pay its
deposit insurance premiums. Then the bank fails iff z < r(1+t)/w1 holds ex post.
40 It follows that
















































Finally, we note that a universal bank will be willing to follow strategy 1 only if
r(1+t)/¯ z < w1. (24)
Equation (24) implies that the bank will not fail with probability one.
b. Net Expected Payoffs Under Strategy 1
It follows from our previous observations that a bank’s net expected profit under strategy 1
equals











The definition of F1 implies that r(w1) ³ 0 holds iff w1 satisfies






































It will subsequently prove useful to know how the bank’s expected net profit varies with the
bank’s equity position. Proposition 2 states a result on this issue.
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that
(g+l)/l³q 1ˆ z 1 [ q 1ˆ z 1−d ( q 1 − q 2 )]/q2ˆ z2d(q1−q2) (a.6)
holds. Then r¢(w1) > 0 for all w1 satisfying (22) and (25).
Proposition 2 is proved in Appendix B. The proposition asserts that if g is large enough relative to
l, then a bank’s expected profit under strategy 1 is increasing in w1, for all feasible values of w1
consistent with non-negative expected profits. We henceforth assume that (a.6) is satisfied.
2. Strategy 2
Under strategy 2, a bank invests q2 in an entrepreneur’s project, and this entitles the bank to
a share w2 of the borrower’s investment return.
41 Since any diversion of funds is impossible, there
is no moral hazard problem. Clearly, then, the lender’s expected return from following strategy
2—not inclusive of his cost of funds—is w2q2ˆ z2 − g.
a. Cost of Funds
A bank following strategy 2 must raise q2(1+t) units of funds to make loans of q2, and to pay
a deposit insurance premium of tq2. Thus, a bank engaged in strategy 2 can pay r per unit deposited
in the second period iff w2z ³ r(1+t). It follows that the bank will fail with probability F[r(1+t)/w2].
















































b. Net Expected Profits Under Strategy 2
It follows from these remarks that a bank pursuing strategy 2 has a net expected profit of
w2q2{ˆ z2 − F2[r(1+t)/w2]} − g.
3. Strategy 3
The third strategy available to a universal bank is as follows. The bank lends a borrower q1
with the intention that the borrower will invest in project 2, and divert q1 − q2 units of funds towards
expenditures on “perks” consumption. The bank claims a fraction, w3, of both the ex post project
return, and of “perks” consumption.
Under this strategy, the expected payoff of the entrepreneur is (1−w3)[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)]. If
instead the entrepreneur could invest in project 1, his expected income would be (1−w3)q1ˆ z1. Since
our assumptions imply that q1ˆ z1 > q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2), the entrepreneur clearly prefers to invest in
project 1. However, if he does so, no “perks” consumption will be generated, and the bank will be
alerted that the firm has deviated from the intended investment strategy. Thus, by threatening to
liquidate the investment if no “perks” consumption occurs, the bank can deter the entrepreneur from
investing in project 1. Or, in other words, under strategy 3 there is no costly moral hazard problem
that arises between the bank and the firm. In effect, in this situation, a universal bank can exercise
its control rights over the firm.
It follows that the expected net return to the bank from following strategy 3—inclusive of
“perks” consumption, but not inclusive of the cost of funds—is given by w3[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)].
a. Cost of Funds
A bank pursuing strategy 3 needs deposits in the amount q1(1+t) to make a loan of q1 and to
cover its deposit insurance premiums. The bank will therefore be able to pay its depositors in the
second period iff its second period income, w3q2z, is no less than rq1(1+t). In other words, the bank39
fails with probability F[(q1/q2)r(1+t)/w3]. And, the bank’s expected second period payments to its
















































































b. Net Expected Profits Under Strategy 3
It follows from our discussion that a bank’s net expected profit from following strategy 3 is
equal to w3[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)] − g − q2w3F2[q1r(1+t)/q2w3].
B. A Determination of the Equity Positions
We now discuss how the value of a bank’s equity position is determined under each of the
three possible bank strategies. In each case we proceed as in Section II, and assume that societal
savings are insufficient to meet all of the potential demand for funds.
42 In Section II this led to the
rationing of credit. As we will show, matters may be different when banks can hold equity positions
in firms. We begin with the determination of w1.
1. Strategy 1
Assumption (a.6) implies that any bank’s expected profits—under strategy 1—are increasing
in w1 (for all feasible values of w1 consistent with non-negative expected profits). Thus, competition
among entrepreneurs for funds implies that w1 must be bid up to the lower of two values: w1 must
either be bid up to its largest feasible level, or it must be bid up to the level at which there is no
longer competition for funds. Under strategy 1 funded entrepreneurs receive the expected payoff
(1−w1)q1ˆ z1; thus competition for funds ceases when (1−w1)q1ˆ z1 = u ¯.40
































q1ˆ z1 − d(q1−q2)
q1ˆ z1
.
The argument just given implies that when banks follow strategy 1, w1 = ¯ w1 holds.
If
d(q1−q2)>u ¯ (a.7)
is satisfied, then under strategy 1 there will be unfunded borrowers who would like to get funding.
They cannot, because if they offer a banker a larger equity claim, strategy 1 will cease to be feasible.
Thus, the pursuit of strategy 1 by banks can be consistent with a phenomenon analogous to credit
rationing. To fix ideas, we henceforth assume that (a.7) holds.
2. Strategy 2
It is straightforward to show that the expected profit of a bank following strategy 2, w2q2ˆ z2 −
g − w2q2F2[r(1+t)/w2], is monotonically increasing in w2. Hence, competition among entrepreneurs
for funds implies that w2 must be bid up to the level where a borrower is just indifferent between
receiving and not receiving funding. Since a funded borrower under strategy 2 receives the expected
payoff (1−w2)q2ˆ z2, it follows that
w2 =( q 2ˆ z 2 − u ¯ )/q2ˆ z2. (27)
3. Strategy 3
The expected profit a bank receives when it follows strategy 3, w3[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)] − g −
w3q2F2[(q1/q2)r(1+t)/w3], is also increasing in w3. Thus, a repetition of the argument just given41
implies that w3 must be bid up until funded and unfunded borrowers receive the same expected utility.
Since a funded borrower has the expected utility level (1−w3)[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)], it follows that
w3 = . (28)
q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)−u
q 2 ˆ z 2+d ( q 1 − q 2 )
C. A Comparison of Alternative Strategies
We now consider the relative rankings of the strategies available to a universal bank. We
begin with a comparison of strategies 1 and 3.
1. Strategy 1 vs. Strategy 3
When (a.7) holds, we have w1 =[ q 1 ˆ z 1−d ( q 1 − q 2 )]/q1ˆ z1, and the expected profit of a bank under
strategy 1 is given by
43




In addition, w3 =[ q 2ˆ z 2+d ( q 1 − q 2 )−u ¯ ]/[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)], and the expected profit of a bank pursuing
strategy 3 equals




We now state a result on the relative rankings of strategies 1 and 3.
PROPOSITION 3. Strategy 3 is preferred to strategy 1, under universal banking if,
l +[ d ( q 1 − q 2 )−u ¯ ]>q 1ˆ z 1−q 2ˆ z 2−d ( q 1 − q 2 ). (29)42
Proposition 3 is proved in Appendix C. The proposition asserts that a universal bank will prefer
strategy 3 to strategy 1 if either l or [d(q1−q2)−u ¯ ] is relatively large, and if project 1 is not too
productive relative to project 2 (inclusive of the “perks” consumption made possible by the diversion
of funds.)
When (29) holds, the relative ranking of strategies 1 and 3 under universal banking is exactly
the opposite of their ranking under commercial banking. Why is this the case? There are three basic
answers to this question.
First, when (a.7) holds, there is a strict upper limit on how large w1 can be while strategy 1
is still feasible. This is not true under strategy 3. Thus, strategy 3 allows a bank to own a larger
fraction of a firm than is possible under strategy 1. In effect, even though the total “surplus” (not
inclusive of the cost of funds) is larger under strategy 1, the bank gets a larger fraction of this surplus
under strategy 3. When (29) holds, the bank prefers a larger fraction of a smaller “pie.”
Second, the bank’s cost of funds is always lower under strategy 3 than under strategy 1
here.
44 In particular, by following strategy 3 a bank fails more often, ceteris paribus, and passes
larger expected costs to the FDIC.
Third, a universal bank has a greater opportunity to share in the “perks” generated by the
diversion of funds than does a commercial bank. By itself, though, this factor would be insufficient
to induce a universal bank to pursue strategy 3. The other two factors we have mentioned must be
present for the bank to prefer strategy 3.
A Remark
When ˜ p(w1) = 1 holds, strategy 1 is socially preferred to strategy 3 iff
q1ˆ z1 − q2ˆ z2 − d(q1−q2)>l . (30)43
Equation (30) asserts that the expected net return from investing q1 in project 1—and engaging in
interim monitoring—exceeds the expected net return from investing q2 in project 2, and from
consuming q1 − q2 in “perks.” Note that (29) and (30) can hold simultaneously. Thus, it can easily
be the case that universal banking provides banks with perverse investment incentives, from a social
perspective.
2. Strategy 2 vs. Strategy 3
We now compare the expected profits yielded by strategy 2 and by strategy 3, under universal
banking. For a universal bank following strategy 2, expected profits are




In addition, w2 =( q 2ˆ z 2 − u ¯ )/q2ˆ z2. It follows that a universal bank prefers strategy 3 to strategy 2 iff








is satisfied. We now state a result giving sufficient conditions for strategy 3 to be preferred to
strategy 2.
PROPOSITION 4. (a) q1w2 > q2w3 holds iff
q2ˆ z2[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)] > u ¯(q2ˆ z2+dq1). (32)
(b) Strategy 3 generates higher expected profits for a universal bank if (32) is satisfied, and if







































The proof of proposition 4 appears in Appendix D. The proposition asserts that a universal
bank will pursue strategy 3 over strategy 2 if (a) u ¯ is sufficiently small, (b) (q2/q1)ˆ z2 > d,
45 and (c)
r(1+t) is sufficiently close to d. In particular, there will be a relatively severe moral hazard problem
under universal banking when the real rate of interest of deposits is relatively low, when the deposit
insurance premium is relatively low, when “perks” are a relatively good substitute for other income,
and when banks have considerable power to extract surplus from “borrowers.”
We henceforth assume that (29) and the conditions of proposition 4 are satisfied.
46 Then
all active banks will pursue strategy 3, in equilibrium. It will therefore be the case that universal
banking creates a severe moral hazard problem: banks do not attempt to control—and, in fact they
condone—the diversion of funds by borrowers. This clearly constitutes a marked contrast with the
situation under commercial banking.
D. A General Equilibrium
As in Section II, there are two requirements of equilibrium beyond what we have discussed
thus far. First, the “marginal” bank must earn a “normal” expected profit. Second, the FDIC must
break even. We now describe the corresponding equilibrium conditions.
When all banks follow strategy 3, each active bank earns the expected profit w3{q2ˆ z2 +
d(q1−q2)−q 2F 2[(q1/q2)r(1+t)/w3]} − g, with w3 =[ q 2ˆ z 2+d ( q 1− q 2)−u ¯]/[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)]. Agents who
could operate banks, but choose not to, pay the lump-sum tax t, and deposit 1 − t. In the second
period their utility is r(1−t). Hence, active banks earn “normal” profits iff
4745






















Equation (35) is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 4.
In order to describe what is required for the FDIC to break even, we must first describe the
mass of active banks. As before, let q denote the fraction of funded borrowers. Under our
assumptions each funded borrower obtains q1 units of funds. Thus, “uses” of funds is aqq1.
“Sources” of funds derive from the single unit saved by agents who neither borrow, nor operate
banks. Hence, sources of funds are 1 − a(1+q). Then sources and uses of funds are equated when
q = (1−a)/a(1+q1).
Our previous assumptions imply that q < 1, and the mass of funded borrowers and—by implica-
tion—active banks is qa = (1−a)/(1+q1).
Each funded borrower, as we have noted, receives a loan of q1. It follows that the FDIC
collects qaq1t = t(1−a)q1/(1+q1) in deposit insurance premiums in the first period, and [1 −
a(1+q)]t = t(1−a)q1/(1+q1) in lump-sum taxes. Since all revenues are deposited, in period two the
FDIC has income of r(1−a)(t+t)q1/(1+q1), not inclusive of the income generated by liquidating failed
banks.
When all banks follow strategy 3, a fraction F[(q1/q2)r(1+t)/w3] of all banks will fail in the
second period. Hence, the FDIC incurs monitoring costs of gFF[(q1/q2)r(1+t)/w3]. In addition, the
FDIC’s obligations to the depositors of failed banks—less the FDIC’s income from bank asset
liquidation—is given by q1r(1+t)−w 3 q 2 F 2 [(q1/q2)r(1+t)/w3]. Thus, the FDIC breaks even if











































Equation (36) is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 4 under the assumption that F(z)/z is
nondecreasing in z. If (35) and (36) have a solution where r(1+t) satisfies (31), then there is an
equilibrium where all active banks follow strategy 3. And, clearly, multiple equilibria are a real
possibility.
IV. A Comparison of Commercial vs. Universal Banking
In Section II we exogenously imposed that all banks were commercial banks (as would be the
case if banks were precluded from taking equity positions). We then derived optimal bank behavior,
and the requirements of a general equilibrium under this assumption. In Section III, we exogenously
imposed that all banks take equity positions. We similarly derived optimal bank behavior—and the
conditions of a general equilibrium—under this requirement. In this section we endogenize bank
choices over whether to acquire debt or equity claims on “borrowers.” In particular, we now pose
the following question: taking r and t as given, when would any individual bank prefer to take an
equity position in a firm, rather than to hold a debt claim? When the values of r and t that satisfy
(35) and (36)—as well as the exogenously given value of t—imply that each active bank would prefer
an equity position to a debt claim, then there is indeed an equilibrium where all banks prefer to
operate as universal rather than commercial banks. When this transpires, we have seen that moral
hazard in banking can potentially become a severe problem, if universal banking is permitted.
48
To fix ideas, in this section we proceed as follows. We assume that all potential bankers are
identical, ex ante. We also assume that strategy 2 is the optimal lending strategy under commercial
banking, while strategy 3 is the optimal strategy under universal banking.
49 Under these
assumptions, the expected profit of a universal bank is




with w3 =[ q 2ˆ z 2+d ( q 1 − q 2 )−u ¯ ]/[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)]. The expected profit of a commercial bank is



















In addition, in order for borrowers to take debt contracts, it must be the case that the expected utility
of a funded borrower is no less than u ¯. In other words,

















It follows that from these observations that a bank would strictly prefer an equity position
over a debt claim if
























is satisfied. We now state a condition under which (38) holds.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that
(q1−q2){d − r(1+t)[1 − F(r(1+t))]} ³g [1 − F(ˆ x2)]. (39)
Then equation (38) is satisfied.
Proposition 5 is proved in Appendix E. The proposition indicates that any bank given a choice will
operate as a universal bank if (a) d is sufficiently large (“perks” consumption is a good substitute for48
other income), (b) the probability of failure as a commercial bank (F[r(1+t)]) is sufficiently large,
and (c) the cost of ex post state verification, g, is sufficiently small. Note in particular that the main
disadvantage of universal banking stems from the large amount of ex post monitoring that it requires.
When ex post monitoring is not very costly, this does not serve as a strong deterrent to banks taking
equity positions.
Finally, we note that proposition 5 gives a relative weak sufficient condition for banks to
prefer equity positions over debt claims. It is by no means necessary that d > r(1+t){1 − F[r(1+t)]}
hold in order for equity positions to be desired.
V. Conclusions
Many claims have been made about the potential benefits, and the potential costs, of adopting
a system of universal banking in the United States. Opponents of a universal banking system have
argued that universal banking can easily exacerbate problems of moral hazard, and increase—perhaps
dramatically—the potential insurance obligations of the FDIC relative to a system of commercial
banking.
For at least some configurations of parameter values, our analysis is quite supportive of these
arguments. And, even when universal banking does not increase the severity of moral hazard
problems in our model, a bank given the choice between a debt claim and an equity position will
choose to hold equity largely because this either enables it to extract a larger portion of the profits
from investment, or to pass a larger portion of its costs onto the FDIC. Universal banks, in short,
have few intrinsic efficiency advantages over commercial banks in the world we have described.
One might suspect that this fact is due entirely to our focus on an environment where costly
state verification problems are present in financial markets. As is well-known (Diamond 1984, Gale-
Hellwig 1985, and Williamson 1986, 1987), the existence of costly state verification tends to favor49
debt as an optimal contractual form. However, our results go well beyond this observation. Indeed,
they indicate conditions under which debt instruments are also well-suited to addressing problems of
moral hazard. This result was not previously known, at least to us. Moreover, it is the case that one
can easily obtain close analogs of our results in a pure risk-shifting model where costly state
verification is entirely absent. Thus, we believe that our results will obtain in a much broader class
of economies than just the one we have described here.
Another feature of our analysis that merits comment is as follows. In practice, many believe
that the benefits of universal banking derive from the fact that that arrangement allows banks to hold
both debt and equity claims on firms. As we have noted, our model has the property that a bank
taking an equity position in a firm has no reason to acquire a debt claim as well. Thus it may appear
that in this way we have “stacked the deck” against universal banking. However, we do not believe
this to be the case. Our main points are that (a) the ability to take equity positions aligns the
incentives of banks and borrowers—potentially at the expense of the FDIC, (b) that when funds are
scarce, the ability to take equity positions enables banks to extract additional surplus from borrowers,
and (c) banks may be able to extract maximum surplus by distorting resource allocations. We see
no reason why these points should be overturned by finding an environment in which there is a
simultaneous role for both debt and equity claims.
Finally, a crucial aspect of our model is the assumption that banks can share in “perks”
consumption iff they hold an equity position in a firm. What do we have in mind here? While
harder to model than “perks” consumption, in practice large universal banks hold control rights in any
number of different firms. This enables them to engineer transactions among these firms that are
beneficial to the bank—although not necessarily beneficial to all parties to the transaction or their
other outside claimants. These powers would be harder to exercise with no equity positions in firms.
Thus, for us, “perks” consumption stands in broadly for an ability to benefit at the expense of other50
claimants by taking hidden actions. We think it is highly plausible that this ability is enhanced by
holding an equity position in a firm.
50
As a last remark, we wish to emphasize that when credit is rationed, a system of universal
banking substantially alters the set of conditions that determine a full general equilibrium in any given
economy. This observation argues for a broader use of general equilibrium methods to evaluate the
relative merits of commercial versus universal banking. This is a topic we hope to pursue in greater
detail in the course of future research.51
Notes
1The key legislation which constrains U.S. banks equity investments is the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933. However, a number of other laws also pertain to this issue, particularly the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 and its 1970 amendments. Incidentally, there are some important exceptions
to the equity investment prohibition. In default situations, banks are permitted to restructure loans
into equity positions with the requirement of divestiture after a few years (see James 1993). Also,
bank holding companies are permitted to form (separately capitalized) venture capital subsidiaries for
the expressed purpose of investing in start up enterprises.
2The different banking regulations undoubtedly affect the entire financial intermediary sector,
not just banks. Restrictions on commercial banking activities have contributed to the development
of a large and active stock market in the United States. Not incidentally, the capitalization of the
German stock market is relatively small, and characterized by thin trading and few listings compared
to the United States (Gorton and Schmid 1996).
3For example, the so-called Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee favors adoption of a
universal banking system in the United States. See “Criticism of Financial Reform Overblown,
Shadow Panel Says,” American Banker, May 6, 1997.
4As we show, in our model banks derive no advantage by taking “mixed” positions consisting
of combinations of debt and equity.
5In the last several years, an attempt has been made (pursuant to the provisions of the FDICIA
Act of 1991) to set deposit insurance premia according to an insured bank’s risk class. However, a
simple flat rate insurance scheme is still a good approximation to reality in the United States, for the
overwhelming majority of banks are categorized in the same (lowest) risk class.
6Santos’ model structure is rather different than ours and produces different conclusions. In
his analysis, when the bank is restricted to making loans (commercial banking) the borrower will52
undertake riskier projects than it would under universal banking. Santos does not consider the
monitoring role of banks in controlling the firm’s moral hazard problem.
7In addition, Boyd and Smith (1994) argue that—for realistic parameter values—the welfare
gains from stochastic monitoring are likely to be small.
8This “diversion of funds” formulation is related to that of Gertler and Hubbard (1988) or
Gertler and Rogoff (1990). The assumption that d£1 implies that expenditures on “perks” never
generate more utility than an equivalent amount of income. In effect, d indexes how good a substitute
“perks” are for other income. The assumption that ˆ z2 > d holds implies that investments in project 2
are more productive than expenditures on “perks” consumption (not inclusive of the costs of state
verification).
9Again this cost may differ across agents in a way that we describe below.
10The analysis would be affected in only a minimal way if we restricted interim monitoring
to be nonstochastic.
11That is, an investment of one unit is required by a bank in order for it to be able to conduct
monitoring activity.
12This assumption is for simplicity only. In practice it can be thought of as each bank makes
loans mostly in a single geographic area or industry, so that returns are correlated across borrowers.
Similar assumptions on “one bank-one borrower” are made by John, John, and Saunders (1994);
Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996); or Santos (1996a).
13This assumption is necessitated by our “one bank-one borrower” specification.
14It would also be natural to assume that deposit insurance is publicly provided if the
feasibility of insurance provision in all states required potential access to seigniorage revenue.
15In effect, a failure to pay r per unit deposited triggers a bankruptcy exactly analogous to53
those in conventional costly state verification models (Diamond 1984, Gale and Hellwig 1985, and
Williamson 1986, 1987).
16We allow for the possibility that gF ³g Hholds. For example, since FDIC employees do not
have the same claim on the assets of monitored banks as lenders do on borrowers, the FDIC may
need to take costly actions to verify that its employees undertake their tasks in an appropriate manner.
17Given our assumptions, this is equivalent to a flat rate tax on deposits. However, specifying
a tax on lending slightly simplifies the calculations in the text.
18In an expanded model we might think of ours as an overlapping generations economy where
the government raises resources from the current young to make payments to the current old
depositors of failed banks. Our assumption on FDIC behavior is intended to give the analysis this
kind of flavor.
19We assume throughout that the lender can commit in advance to liquidate the investment
if it is discovered that the borrower has invested in project 2. Thus renegotiation is not a possibility.
20All of these “perks” would be consumed by the borrower, since the bank has no ownership
position in the firm.
21Whether (a.2) holds or not depends, in general, on the equilibrium value of x1. We describe
its determination below. Note that (a.2) is more likely to hold the larger is x1; that is, moral hazard
problems appear when rates of interest on loans are sufficiently high.
22Assumptions (a.2) and (a.3) imply that p >0 .
23We emphasize that this is by no means essential to most of our discussion. We show below
that credit rationing must obtain if a > (2+q2)
−1, and if u ¯ is sufficiently low.
24Of course, in order for borrowers to participate in the loan market, q1{ˆ z1−x1+ ò
x
01 G(z)dz} ³
u ¯ must hold. If this condition is violated by ˆ x1, then the interest rate must be lowered until borrowers54
are indifferent between obtaining, and not obtaining, credit. Of course, in this case credit is not
rationed. We confine our attention to the situation where credit is rationed in the text.
25Recall that there is a cost to letting the borrower operate project 2, since ˆ z1 > ˆ z2.



















F(z)dz ³ u ¯
must hold for ˆ x2 to be charged. If ˆ x2 violates this condition, the same comments as in footnote 29
apply.
27As before all “perks” consumption accrues to the borrower because no one else has an
ownership position in the borrower’s project.
28If the bank lent q Î (q2,q1) to the borrower, it would be clear to the FDIC that the bank was
not attempting to control the moral hazard problem. We assume that this is unacceptable to the
FDIC. However, if the bank lends q1, the FDIC cannot distinguish between a bank following strategy
1, and a bank following strategy 3.
29Of course this strategy may not be feasible, since





need not hold. The discussion in the text assumes that this condition does hold.
30The last statement presumes that (a.2) holds, so that p(ˆ x1)>0 .
31There are many reasons why F(ˆ x2)>G ( ˆ x 1 ) might be satisfied. Indeed, assumption (a.1)
implies that this condition must be satisfied if ˆ x2 > ˆ x1. The inequality ˆ x2 > ˆ x1 will necessarily hold
if ˆ x2 violates (4). Such a violation can result whenever d(q1−q2)/q1 is sufficiently large.55
32The FDIC’s (expected) payments depend on r directly, because each depositor of a failed
bank must be paid the difference between r and the per-depositor value of the bank’s assets. They
depend on r indirectly because r influences the optimal lending strategy of each active bank, and
hence the probability that any given bank will fail.
33This is truce since the FDIC reinvests all its tax revenue in credit markets.
34Of course as we have noted, this is not the only possibility.
35In particular, the FDIC must cover the average difference between the promised payment
per unit deposited, r, and the amount that banks pay out to depositors and the FDIC.
36That is, the locus defined by (17) can fail to be increasing at most a single value of r(1+t);
the value that renders banks indifferent between strategies 1 and 2.
37If G(z)/z or F(z)/z can be decreasing in z there are clearly several other possible
configurations of the locus defined by (17). We do not exhaust the set of possibilities here.
38We do not consider the possibility in this paper that some banks are commercial banks while
others are universal banks.
39In particular, if the entrepreneur diverts funds without the bank’s knowledge, we assume that
the entrepreneur does not have to share “perks” consumption with the bank. In effect, then, there is
a managerial incentive problem.
40Notice that, for any given value of r, the probability that a bank following strategy 1 will
fail is higher under universal banking than under commercial banking. The same is true of strategies
2 and 3. Of course, it bears emphasis that this argument is purely of a partial equilibrium nature.
41Note that w2 can, and typically will, be different from w1.
42As in Section II, this must be the case if assumption (a.5) is satisfied.
43Note that p(w1) = 1 holds.
44This fact is demonstrated in Appendix C.
45That is, if project 2 yields a sufficiently high return relative to d.56
46When there are high and low cost banks, we assume that these conditions are satisfied for
both types of banks.
47If there are low and high cost banks that are both active in equilibrium, (35) must hold only
for high cost banks.
48Of course if the values r and t satisfying (35) and (36) do not have the property (in
conjunction with t) that banks prefer equity to debt claims, then there is no equilibrium in which all
banks operate as universal banks. In this case, if the values r and t satisfying (12) and (17) have the
property that all banks prefer debt to equity claims, then there is an equilibrium in which all banks
operate as commercial banks. Clearly multiple equilibria are possible as well. So are equilibria
where banks are indifferent between taking debt and equity positions, and where they take some of
each.
49As we have seen, this will be the optimal configuration of strategies if interim monitoring
costs are relatively high, if (q2/q1)ˆ z2 > d, and if r(1+t) is relatively low.
50See Akerlof and Romer (1993) for an alternative discussion of how different contractual
forms give rise to similar types of problems. They also provide a number of illustrative examples
in the context of banking.57
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1. A commercial bank strictly prefers strategy 2 to strategy 3 iff
x(ˆ x2,q2;g)−F 2 [ r (1+t)] > x[(q1/q2)ˆ x1,q2;g]−F 2 [(q1/q2)r(1+t)]. (A.1)
By definition, x(ˆ x2,q2;g) ³x [(q1/q2)ˆ x1,q2;g] must hold. In addition, F2[(q1/q2)r(1+t)] > F2[r(1+t)] holds
as well, since F¢ 2 > 0. This establishes the claim.
B. Proof of Proposition 2. Clearly


























Therefore r¢(w1) > 0 holds for all w1 satisfying (25) if

































Then obviously a sufficient condition for r¢(w1)>0t oobtain, for all w1 obeying (25), is that
g/l³w 1˜ p ¢ ( w 1 )−˜ p ( w 1 ). (A.4)
Now the condition (A.4) has the following equivalent representation:
g/l³[(q1ˆ z1 − q2ˆ z2)/q2ˆ z2]+[ d ( q 1 − q 2 )/q2ˆ z2](2w1−1)/(1−w1)
2. (A.4¢)
Therefore, since the right-hand side of (A.4¢) is increasing in w1, r¢(w1) > 0 must hold for all w1
satisfying (22) and (25) if
(g+l)/l³( q 1ˆ z 1 / q 2ˆ z 2 )+( q 1ˆ z 1 )
2 { 1−[ 2 d ( q 1 − q 2 )/q1ˆ z1]}/q2ˆ z2d(q1−q2). (A.5)
Rearranging terms in (A.5) gives (a.6).58
C. Proof of Proposition 3. The observations in the text imply that a universal bank prefers strategy
3 to strategy 1 iff








We now show that








is necessarily satisfied. Then (29) is obviously sufficient for (A.6) to hold.
To establish (A.7), we begin with the following result.
Lemma A1. q1w1 ³ q2w3 holds.
Proof of Lemma A1. The condition q1w1 ³ q2w3 is easily shown to be equivalent to
ˆ z2(ˆ z1−d)(q1−q2)+[ d ˆ z 1 ( q 1 − q 2 )
2 / q 2 ]³[ d
2 ( q 1 − q 2 )
2 / q 2 ]−ˆ z 1 u ¯ . (A.8)
But (A.8) must hold since ˆ z1 > d.






























We now make use of the following result.59
Lemma A2. Define the function H(s)b y











Then H(s) ³ 0, for all s ³ 1.
Together lemmas A1 and A2 imply that H[(q2w3)/(q1w1)] ³ 0, implying that (A.7) is satisfied. Our
proof is therefore completed by the following:










































































It is then immediate that H(s) ³ 0 " s ³ 1.
D. Proof of Proposition 4. A universal bank prefers strategy 3 to strategy 2 iff









w3 − w2 = u ¯d(q1−q2)/q2ˆ z2[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2) ]>0 .
We now prove part (a) of the proposition.
(a) Using the expressions stated in the text for w2 and w3, it is straightforward to verify that
q1w2 > q2w3 holds iff
q1 − q2 > u ¯(q1−q2)(q2ˆ z2 + dq1)/(q2ˆ z2)[q2ˆ z2 + d(q1−q2)]. (A.11)60
Rearranging terms in (A.11) gives (32) in the text.
(b) If (32) holds, then satisfaction of (33) implies the satisfaction of (A.10). This establishes
part (b) of the proposition.
(c) When (32) holds, a sufficient condition for (33) to be satisfied is that












(q1w2/q2w3)−1>( q 1 / q 2 ) w 2−1=[ ( q 1 − q 2 ) q 2ˆ z 2−q 1 u ¯ ]/(q2)
2ˆ z2.
It follows that (A.12) must be satisfied if











Finally, (a.7) implies that q2ˆ z2 −[ q 1 u ¯ /(q1−q2)] < q2ˆ z2 − q1d. It follows that (34) implies the
satisfaction of (A.12), completing the proof.
E. Proof of Proposition 5.
In order to prove proposition 5, we begin by noting that equation (38) has the following equivalent
representation:
























We now show that (39) implies the satisfaction of (A.14), and hence of (38). To do so we note that61








and (39) necessarily imply the satisfaction of (A.14), since
















holds. Thus, to prove the proposition, we need only establish that (A.15) obtains. We begin with the
following lemma.
Lemma A3. Define the function D(s)b y









Proof of Lemma A3. Clearly,


































































































Then D(s) ³ D(1), for all s £ 1, establishing the claim.
Lemma A3 implies that

























But (A.16) and (A.17) together yield (A.15), and therefore (39) implies the satisfaction of (38).63
References
Akerlof, George A., and Paul M. Romer. “Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for
Profit.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1–60, 1993.
Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale. “A Welfare Comparison of Intermediaries and Financial Markets
in Germany and the U.S.” European Economic Review 39 (1995), 179–209.
Berlin, Mitchell, Kose John, and Anthony Saunders. “Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and
Financial Distress.” Review of Financial Studies 9 (1996), 889–919.
Boot, Arnoud, and Anjan V. Thakor. “Financial System Architecture.” Working Paper, Indiana
University, 1994.
___________. “Banking Scope, Financial Innovation, and the Evolution of the Financial System.”
Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
Boyd, John H., and Bruce D. Smith. “How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic Versus
Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment.” Journal of Business
67 (1994), 539–61.
Corrigan, Gerald. Annual Report. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1983.
__________. “The Separation of Banking From Commerce.” Statement before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, July 18, 1987.
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole. The Prudential Regulation of Banks. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1994.
Diamond, Douglas. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” Review of Economic
Studies 51 (1984), 393–414.
Gale, Douglas, and Martin Hellwig. “Incentive–Compatible Debt Contracts: The One Period
Problem.” Review of Economic Studies 52 (1985), 647–63.64
Gertler, Mark, and R. Glenn Hubbard. “Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations.” Financial
Market Volatility. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1988.
Gertler, Mark, and Kenneth Rogoff. “North–South Lending and Endogenous Domestic Capital
Market Inefficiencies.” Journal of Monetary Economics 26 (1990), 245–66.
Gorton, Gary, and Joseph G. Haubrich. “Bank Deregulation, Credit Markets, and the Control of
Capital.” Carnegie–Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 26 (1987), 289–334.
Gorton, Gary, and Frank A. Schmid. “Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms.”
Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, 1996.
Hauswald, Robert B. H. “Financial Contracting, Reorganization and Mixed Finance: A Theory of
Banking Systems.” Manuscript, University of Maryland, 1996.
James, Christopher. “When Do Banks Take Equity? An Analysis of Bank Loan Restructuring and
the Role of Public Debt.” Working Paper, University of Florida, 1993.
John, Kose, T. A. John, and Anthony Saunders. “Universal Bank and Firm Risk Taking.” Journal
of Banking and Finance 18 (1994), 307–23.
Kareken, John H., and Neil Wallace. “Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial
Equilibrium Exposition.” Journal of Business 51 (July 1978), 413–38.
Kroszner, Randall S., and Raghuran G. Rajan. “Is the Glass–Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the
U.S. Experience With Universal Banking Before 1933.” American Economic Review 84
(1994), 810–32.
Merton, Robert C. “An Analytical Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees:
An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory.” Journal of Business and Finance 1 (June
1977), 3–11.
Pozdena, Randall J. “Why Banks Need Commerce Powers.” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Review (1991), 18–30.65
Santos, Joao. “Bank Capital and Equity Investment Regulations.” Working Paper, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, 1996a.
___________. “Commercial Banks in the Securities Business: A Review.” Working Paper, Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 1996b.
Saunders, Anthony. “Banking and Commerce: An Overview of Public Policy Issues.” Journal of
Banking and Finance 18 (1994), 231–54.
_________. Financial Institutions Management: A Modern Perspective. New York: Irwin, 1997.
Saunders, Anthony, and Ingo Walter. Universal Banking in the United States: What Could We
Gain? What Could We Lose? New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Townsend, Robert M. “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets With Costly State Verification.”
Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 265–93.
Williamson, Stephen D. “Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation and Equilibrium Credit
Rationing.” Journal of Monetary Economics 18 (1986), 159–79.
___________. “Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102 (1987), 135–45.